Abstract. It is well-known that natural axiomatic theories are well-ordered by consistency strength. However, it is possible to construct descending chains of artificial theories with respect to consistency strength. We provide an explanation of this well-orderness phenomenon by studying a coarsening of the consistency strength order, namely, the Π 1 1 reflection strength order. We prove that there are no descending sequences of Π 1 1 sound extensions of ACA 0 in this order. Accordingly, we can attach a rank in this order, which we call reflection rank, to any Π 1 1 sound extension of ACA 0 . We prove that for any Π 1 1 sound theory T extending ACA0 , the reflection rank of T equals the proof-theoretic ordinal of T . We also prove that the proof-theoretic ordinal of α iterated Π 1 1 reflection is εα. Finally, we use our results to provide straightforward wellfoundedness proofs of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles.
Introduction
It is a well-known empirical phenomenon that natural axiomatic theories are wellordered 1 by many popular metrics of proof-theoretic strength, such as consistency strength. This phenomenon is manifest in ordinal analysis, a research program whereby recursive ordinals are assigned to theories to measure their proof-theoretic strength. However, these metrics of proof-theoretic strength do not well-order axiomatic theories in general. For instance, there are descending chains of sound theories, each of which proves the consistency of the next. However, all such examples of ill-foundedness make use of unnatural, artificial theories. Without a mathematical definition of "natural," it is unclear how to provide a general mathematical explanation of the apparent well-orderedness of the hierarchy of natural theories.
In this paper we introduce a metric of proof-theoretic strength and prove that it is immune to these pathological instances of ill-foundedness. Recall that a theory T is Π This metric of proof-theoretic strength is coarser than consistency strength, but, as we noted, it is also more robust. In practice, when one shows that U proves the consistency of T , one often also establishes the stronger fact that U proves the Π 1 1 soundness of T . Our first main theorem is the following. Thanks to Lev Beklemishev and Antonio Montalbán for helpful discussion. First author is supported in part by Young Russian Mathematics award. 1 Of course, by well-ordered here we mean pre-well-ordered. Accordingly, we can attach a well-founded rank-reflection rank-to Π proof-theoretic ordinal |T | WO of a theory T is the supremum of the order-types of T -provably well-founded primitive recursive linear orders. We will show that the reflection ranks and proof-theoretic ordinals of theories are closely connected. Recall that ACA0 is axiomatized over ACA 0 by the statement "for every X, the ω th jump of X exists." To prove these results, we extend techniques from the proof theory of iterated reflection principles to the second-order context. In particular, we focus on iterated Π The formalization of this in arithmetic require some additional efforts; see §2 for details.
Iterated reflection principles have been used previously to calculate proof-theoretic ordinals. For instance, Schmerl [15] established bounds on provable arithmetical transfinite induction principles for fragments of PA. Beklemishev [2] has also calculated proof-theoretic ordinals of subsystems of PA via iterated reflection. These results differ from ours in two important ways. First, these results concern only theories in the language of first-order arithmetic, and hence do not engender calculations of Π 1 1 proof-theoretic ordinals. Second, these results are notation-dependent, i.e., they involve the calculation of proof-theoretic ordinals modulo the choice of a particular (natural) ordinal notation system. We are concerned with Π 1 1 reflection. Hence, in light of Theorem 1.2, we are able to calculate proof-theoretic ordinals in a manner that is not sensitive to the choice of a particular ordinal notation systems. Note that the following theorem is independent of the choice of any particular ordinal notation. It is possible to prove Theorem 1.4 and Theorem 1.5 by formalizing infinitary derivations in ACA 0 and appealing to cut-elimination, and in an early draft of this paper we did just that. Lev Beklemishev suggested that it might be possible to prove these results with methods from the proof theory of iterated reflection principles, namely conservation theorems in the style of Schmerl [15] . Though these methods have become quite polished for studying subsystems of first-order arithmetic, they have not yet been extended to Π 1 1 ordinal analysis. Thus, we devote a section of the paper to developing these techniques in the context of second-order arithmetic. We thank Lev for encouraging us to pursue this approach. Our main result in this respect is the following conservation theorem, where Π To prove this result, we establish connections between Π 1 1 reflection over secondorder theories and reflection over arithmetical theories with free set variables.
Finally, we demonstrate that Theorem 1.2 facilitates straightforward well-foundedness proofs for certain ordinal notation systems. A recent development in ordinal analysis is the use of ordinal notation systems that are based on reflection principles. Roughly, the elements of such notation systems are reflection principles and they are ordered by proof-theoretic strength. Such notation systems have been extensively studied since Beklemishev [3] endorsed their use as an approach to the canonicity problem for ordinal notations. See [8] for a survey of such notation systems. We prove the well-foundedness of Beklemishev's reflection notation system for ε 0 . We expect that our techniques-or extensions thereof-could be used to prove the well-foundedness of ordinal notation systems for stronger axiomatic theories.
Here is our plan for the rest of the paper. In §2 we fix our notation and introduce some key definitions. In §3 we present our technique for showing that certain classes of theories are well-founded or nearly well-founded by various notions of prooftheoretic strength. Our first application of this technique establishes Theorem 1.2. In §3 we prove various conservation results that connect iterated reflection principles with transfinite induction. The theorems in §3 extend results of Schmerl from firstorder theories to pseudo Π 1 1 theories, i.e., to theories axiomatized by formulas with at most free set variables, and to second-order theories We conclude with a proof of Theorem 1.6. In §4 we establish connections between the reflection-ranks and proof-theoretic ordinals of theories, including proofs of Theorem 1.5 and Theorem 1.4. In §5 we show how to use our results to prove the well-foundedness of ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles. We present an explicit example by proving the well-foundedness of Beklemishev's notation system for ε 0 .
Definitions and notation
In this section we describe and justify our choice of meta-theory. We then fix some notation and present some key definitions. Finally, we describe a prooftechnique that we will use repeatedly throughout the paper, namely, Schmerl's technique of reflexive induction.
Treatment of theories.
Recall that EA is a finitely axiomatizable theory in the language of arithmetic with the exponential function, i.e., in the signature p0, 1,`,ˆ, 2
x , ďq. EA is characterized by the standard recursive axioms for addition, multiplication, and exponentiation as well as the induction schema for ∆ 0 formulas. Note that by ∆ 0 formulas we mean ∆ 0 formulas in the language with exponentiation. EA is strong enough to facilitate typical approaches to arithmetization of syntax. Moreover, EA proves its own Σ 1 completeness.
We will also be interested in EA`. EA`is a theory in the language of EA. EAè xtends EA by the additional axiom "superexponentiation is total." By superexponentiation, we mean the function 2 . EA`is the weakest extension of EA in which the cut-elimination theorem is provable. Indeed, the cut-elimination theorem is equivalent to the totality of superexponentiation over EA. See [10] for details on EA and EA`in slightly different formalism without an explicit symbol for exponentiation. We will use EA`as a meta-theory for proving many of our results.
In the paper we will examine theories in three different languages. First the language of first-order arithmetic, i.e., the language of EA. Second the language of first-order arithmetic extended with one additional free set variable X; we also call this the pseudo-Π 1 1 language. And finally the language of second-order arithmetic. The language of first-order arithmetic of course is a sublanguage of the other two languages. And we consider the pseudo-Π 1 1 language to be a sublanguage of the language of second-order arithmetic by identifying pseudo-Π 1 1 sentences F with the second-order sentences @X F.
In the first-order context we are interested in the standard arithmetical complexity classes Π n and Σ n . We write Π 8 to denote the class of arithmetical formulas. We write Π 0 n to denote the class of formulas that are just like Π n formulas except that their formulas (potentially) contain a free set variable X. Formulas in the complexity class Π 0 n cannot have set quantifiers, and so contain only free set variables. Of course, the class Σ 0 n is defined dually to the class Π 0 n . We write Π 0 8
to denote the class of boldface arithmetical formulas, i.e., the class of arithmetical formulas (potentially) with a free set variable.
In the second-order context we are interested in the standard analytical complexity classes Π For example, the theory PApXq contains (i) the axioms of PA and (ii) induction axioms for all formulas in the language, including those with free set variables. The theories EApXq, EA`pXq, and IΣ 1 pXq are defined analogously, i.e., their induction axioms are extended to include formulas with the free set variable X.
Formulas in any of the three languages we are working with can naturally be identified with words in a suitable finite alphabet, which, in turn, are naturally oneto-one encoded by numbers. Accordingly, we can fix a Gödel numbering of these languages. We denote the Gödel number of an expression τ by xτ y. Many natural syntactic relations (x is a logical axiom, z the result of applying Modus Ponens to x and y, x encodes a Π n formula, etc.) are elementary definable and their simplest properties can be verified within EA. We also fix a one-to-one elementary coding of finite sequences of natural numbers. xx 1 , ..., x n y denotes the code of a sequence x 1 , ..., x n and, for any fixed n, is an elementary function of x 1 , ..., x n .
The closed term 1`1`...`1 (n times) is the numeral of n and is denotedn. We often omit the bar when no confusion can occur. We also often omit the corner quotes from Gödel numbers when no confusion can occur. For instance, we can encode notion of a formula ϕ being provable in a theory T , by saying that there is a T -proof (a sequence subject to certain constraints) the last element of which is the numeral of the Gödel number of ϕ. However, instead of writing Prpx ϕyq to say that ϕ is provable we simply write Prpϕq.
We have partial truth-definitions Tr Πn and Tr Σn for the classes Π n and Σ n in the theory EA. n pXq. In each of the cases just specified, the truth-definition for the class C is itself a C formula, and the uniform Tarski biconditionals are provable in the theory T in question, i.e., for any ϕp xq P C,
We are concerned with recursively enumerable theories. Officially, a theory T is a Σ 1 formula Ax T pxq that is understood as a formula defining the (Gödel numbers of) axioms of T in the standard model of arithmetic, i.e., the set of axioms of T is tϕ : N ( Ax T pϕqu. Thus, we are considering theories intensionally, via their axioms, rather than as deductively closed sets of formulas. Using this formula τ one could naturally define proof predicate for T , i.e., a Σ 1 formula Prf T px, yq which represents the relation "x encodes a T proof of the formula encoded by y." The predicate Pr T pyq is shorthand for DxPrf T px, yq. We use the predicate ConpT q as shorthand for Pr T pKq, where we fix K to be some contradictory sentence.
Suppose T and U are recursively enumerable theories in the same language. We write T Ď U if T is a subtheory of U which we formalize in arithmetic as the formula @ϕ`Pr T pϕq Ñ Pr U pϕq˘. We write T " U if T Ě U and U Ě T . For a class C of sentences of the language of T we write T Ď C U if the set of C-theorems of T is the subset of C-theorems of U which again could be naturally formalized in arithmetic @ϕ P C`Pr T pϕq Ñ Pr U pϕq˘. We write T " C U if T Ď C U and U Ď C T .
Ordinal notations.
There are many ways of treating ordinal notations in arithmetic. We choose one specific method that will be suitable for the case of working in the theory EA`(and its extensions). Our results will be valid for other natural choices of treating ordinal notations, but some of the proofs would have to be tweaked slightly.
Officially, a notation for an ordinal is a triple xϕpx, yq, p, ny where ϕ P ∆ 0 , p is a Gödel number of an EA proof that ϕ is a non-strict linear order, and Tr Σ1`ϕ pn, nq˘. Note that here we treat ϕ as a binary realtion on the set of all x such that ϕpx, xq.
Let α " xϕpx, yq, p, ny and β " xϕpx, yq, p, my. If two triples have different first coordinates or different second coordinates then they are incomparable. If two triples α " xϕ, p, ny and β " xϕ, p, my have the same first coordinate and the same second coordinate then we compare them as follows. We say that α ă β if Tr Σ1`ϕ pn, mq˘but Tr Σ1` ϕpm, nq˘.
First we note that the theory EA`proves Π 2 soundness of EA (i.e. RFN Π2 pEAq, see section below). And we note that for any ∆ 0 formula ϕpx, yq the sentence expressing that ϕpx, yq is a non-strict linear order is Π 1 sentence. Using this two facts we could prove in EA`that restricted to triples all of which share their first two coordinates, ă is a non-strict linear ordering.
An alternative (more standard) approach to treating ordinal notations in arithmetic is to have fixed elementary ordinal notation up to some ordinal α. This is a fixed linear order L " pD L , ă L q, where both D L Ď N and ă L Ď NˆN are given by ∆ 0 formulas such that (i) L is provably linear in EA, (ii) L is well-founded, and (iii) the order type of L is α. There is an empirical observation that the ordinal notation systems that arise from ordinal analysis results in proof theory are of this kind [14] . Note that in our approach for any L of this sort we could easily form an ordinal notation α such that there is a Kalmar elementary isomorphism f between L and ptβ | β ă αu, ăq and moreover the latter is provable in EA. Here for α " xϕpx, yq, p, ny we could put ϕ to be some naturally formed ∆ 0 presentation of L`1, p to be a EA proof of linearity of ϕ (constructed from the proof of linearity of L) and n to be the greatest element in the order ϕ.
Further we will work with ordinal notation systems that are given by some combinatorially defined system of terms and order on them. The standard example of such a system is Cantor ordinal notation system up to ε 0 . For the notations that we will consider it will be always possible to formalize in EA the definition and proof of linearity of the order. Thus as described above we will be able to form an ordinal notation α such that there will be a natural isomorphism between ptβ | β ă αu, ăq and the initial combinatorially defined ordinal notation system. We will make transitions from combinatorial definitions of notation systems to ordinal notation systems in our sense without any further comments.
2.3. Reflection principles. Suppose C is some class of formulas in one of the three langages that we consider and T is a theory in the same language. The uniform C reflection principle RFN C pT q over T is the schema @ x`Pr T pϕp xqq Ñ ϕp xqf or all ϕ P C, where x are free number variables and ϕp xq contains no other variables.
In those cases for which we have a truth-definition for C in T the scheme RFN C pT q can be axiomatized by the single formula @ϕ P C`Pr T pϕq Ñ Tr C pϕq˘.
Given an ordinal notation system ă, we informally define the operation R of iterated reflection along ă as follows.
More formally, we appeal to Gödel's fixed point lemma in EA. We fix formula RFN-Inst C pU, xq that formalizes the fact that x is an instance of the scheme RFN C pU q. We now want to define Σ 1 formula Ax R α C pT q pxq (note that α, T , and x are arguments of the formula) that define the set of axioms of theories R α C pT q. We define the formula as a fixed point:
note that when we substitute R β C pT q in RFN-Inst C we actually substitute (the Gödel number of) Ax R β C pT q . This approach to defining progressions of iterated reflection principles is due to Beklemishev [1] ; a more modern approach is in [6] . The main method for proving claims about these progressions is reflexive induction (see section below). It is easy to prove that the definition provides a unique (up to EA provable deductive equivalence) definition of the theories RFN α C pT q. 
Löb's theorem then yields T $ @αϕpαq. ❑ Accordingly, to prove claims of the form T $ @αϕpαq, we often prove that
Theorem. While working inside T , we refer to the assumption Pr T`@ γ ă αϕpγqȃ s the reflexive induction hypothesis.
Well-foundedness and reflection principles
In this section we develop a technique for showing that certain classes of axiomatic theories are well-founded under various notions of proof-theoretic strength. Our technique is inspired by H. Friedman's [9] proof of the following result originally due to Steel [19] . Theorem 3.1. Let P Ă R 2 be arithmetic. Then there is no sequence px n q năω such that for every n, both x n ě T x 1 n`1 and also x n`1 is the unique y such that P px n , yq.
Friedman and Steel were not directly investigating the well-foundedness of axiomatic systems, but rather an analogous phenomenon from recursion theory, namely, the well-foundedness of natural Turing degrees under Turing reducibility. The adaptability of Friedman's proof arguably strengthens the analogy between these phenomena.
In this section we study both first and second order theories. The first theory that we treat with our technique is ACA 0 , a familiar subsystem of second-order arithmetic from reverse mathematics. ACA 0 is arithmetically conservative over PA. We then turn to other applications of our technique. We consider RCA 0 , another subsystem of second-order arithmetic and familiar base theory from reverse mathematics. RCA 0 is conservative over IΣ 1 . We then turn to first-order theories, and we study elementary arithmetic EA as our object theory. Proof. In order to prove the result in ACA 0 we will show inconsistency of the theory ACA 0 plus the following statement DS, which says that there is a descending sequence of Π 
We prove that ACA 0`D S proves its own consistency. The inconsistency of ACA 0`D S then follows from Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. We reason in ACA 0`D S.
Let E : xT i | i P Ny be a sequence of theories witnessing the truth of DS. Let us consider the sentence F DU :
The sentence F is true since we could take xT i`1 : i P Ny as U . It is easy to observe that F is Σ ConpT 0`F q. Now using the fact that Pr T0`R FN Π 1 1 pT 1 q˘and that T 0 Ě ACA 0 we conclude,
But it is easy to see that RFN Π 1 1 pT 1 q`F implies DS in ACA 0 . Indeed, we may take xT 1 , T 2 , ...q as our new witness to DS. Thus, we conclude that ConpACA 0`D Sq. ❑ We now observe that a similar result holds over RCA 0 . To do so, we consider formulas from the complexity class Π For the rest of the section we will focus our attention on firstorder theories extending EA. In this subsection we study such theories with respect to Π 3 soundness. We recall that a theory T is Π 3 sound if every Π 3 theorem of T is true. We can express the Π 3 soundness of T with a single Π 3 sentence.
Note that (provably in EA) a theory T is Π 3 sound just in case T is 2-consistent, i.e., just in case T is consistent with any true Π 2 sentence. Theorem 3.5. There is no recursively enumerable sequence pT n q năω of r.e. extensions of EA such that T 0 is Π 3 sound and such that for every n, T n $ RFN Π3 pT n`1 q.
Proof. If the theorem fails, then the following sentence is true,
here e is understood as an index for a Turing machine enumerating the sequence
We show that EA`DS proves its own consistency, whence, by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, EA`DS is inconsistent and hence DS is false.
Work in EA`DS. Since DS is true, it has some witness e : xT i | i P Ny. We now consider the sequence e 1 that results from omitting T 0 from e. More formally, we consider the sequence e 1 : xT 1 i | i P Ny, which is numerated by the Turing functional
From the first conjunct of DS we infer that RFN Π3 pT 0 q. That is, T 0 is consistent with any Π 2 truth. Thus, we infer that
On the other hand, from DS we infer that T 0 proves the Π 3 soundness of T 1 0 . So it is consistent that e 1 witnesses DS. ❑ 3.3. Consistency. In this subsection we provide a new proof of a theorem independently due to H. Friedman, Smorynski, and Solovay (see [12, 18] ). Before stating the theorem we recall that, provably in EA, a theory T is consistent just in case T is Π 1 sound, i.e., if every Π 1 theorem of T is true.
Theorem 3.6.
There is no recursively enumerable sequence pT n q năω of r.e. extensions of EA such that T 0 is consistent and such that EA $ @x Pr Tx`C onpT x`1 q˘.
Proof. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that there is a recursively enumerable sequence pT n q năω of r.e. extensions of EA such that T 0 is consistent and such that
Since EA is sound, we also infer that for every n, T n $ ConpT n`1 q. Thus the following sentence is true.
here e is understood as an index for a Turing machine enumerating the sequence xT 0 , T 1 , ...y.
Work in EA`DS. Since DS is true, it has some witness e : xT i | i P Ny. We consider the sequence e 1 : xT 1 i | i P Ny that results from dropping T 0 from the sequence produced by e. More formally, we consider the sequence e 1 which is numerated by the Turing functional te 1 u : x Þ Ñ teupx`1q.
Claim. e 1 is provably a witness to DS in T 0 .
To see that e 1 provably witnesses the third conjunct of DS in T 0 , we reason as follows.
x`1 q since T 0 extends EA. To see that e 1 provably witnesses the second conjunct of DS in T 0 , we reason as follows.
We now show that e 1 provably witnesses the first conjunct of DS in T 0 . From the first conjunct of DS we infer that ConpT 0 q. It follows that T 0 is Π 1 sound. We reason as follows.
We then infer that ConpT 1 0 q by the Π 1 soundness of T 0 . So e 1 is provably a witness to DS in a consistent theory. Therefore EA`DS is consistent. ❑ Remark 3.7. Note that we just proved the non-existence of EA-provably descending sequences. Without the condition of EA provability such descending sequences do exist. H. Friedman, Smorynski, and Solovay independently proved that there is a sequence xT 0 , T 1 , ...y of consistent extensions of EA such that for all n, T n $ ConpT n`1 q, answering a question of Gaifman; see [18] for details.
3.4. Π 2 soundness. We now know that there are no descending sequences of Π 3 sound theories with respect to Π 3 reflection order, but there are descending sequences of consistent theories with respect to consistency strength. In this subsection we treat the remaining case, namely, Π 2 soundness. We prove that there is an infinite sequences xT 0 , T 1 , ...y of Π 2 sound extensions of EA such that for all n, T n $ RFN Π2 pT n`1 q. In this sense, Theorem 3.5 is best possible. In the section, for technical reasons it will be useful for us to impose some natural conditions on proof predicate. We make sure that any proof in our proof system has only one conclusion, whence
Moreover, we arrange the proof system so that indices for statements are less than or equal to the indices for their proofs, i.e., (1) EA $ @x, ypPrf T px, yq Ñ y ď xq.
Note that the conclusions of all the theorems in our paper are not sensitive to the choice of proof predicate as long as the resulting provability predicates are EA-provably equivalent. And it is easy to see that even if our initial choice of Prf T px, ϕq didn't satisfied the mentioned conditions it is easy to modify it to satisfy the conditions, while preserving provability predicate Pr T pϕq up to EA-provable equivalence.
Recall that, provably in EA, a theory is Σ 1 sound if and only if it is Π 2 sound. We will prove the claim in terms of Σ 1 reflection.
Theorem 3.8.
There is a recursive sequence e " xϕ i P L 1 | i P Ny of sentences such that EA`ϕ 0 is Σ 1 -sound and for each i we have EA`ϕ i $ RFN Σ1 pEA`ϕ i`1 q.
Proof. We put ϕ i to be
First let us check that all ϕ i are Σ 1 -sound. We note that Gödel's second incompleteness theorem holds for any predicate that satisfies Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions. Note that for each r.e. theory T Ě EA the predicate of 1-provability in T (provability in the theory T`"all true Σ 2 -sentences") satisfies Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions, although not being Σ 1 . Hence Gödel's second incompleteness theorem is applicable to it; note that T is consistency with respect to 1-provability iff it is Σ 1 -sound. Thus, for any Σ 1 -sound theory T the theory T` RFN Σ1 pEAq is also Σ 1 -sound. The theory IΣ 2 is Σ 1 -sound and hence the theory IΣ 2` RFN Σ1 pIΣ 2 q is Σ 1 -sound too. At the same time, using Σ 1 -induction, we easily prove in IΣ 2 that @xpRFN Σ1 pR x Σ1 pEAqqq. Thus for each i we have IΣ 2` RFN Σ1 pEAq $ ϕ i . Hence for each i the theory EA`ϕ i is Σ 1 -sound. Now we check that for each i, the theory EA proves that ϕ i implies RFN Σ1 pEAφ i`1 q. Since IΣ 2 is Σ 1 -sound and EA is Σ 1 1-complete, we know that for each (standard) natural number p, if p is the Gödel number of some IΣ 2 -proof of some Σ 1 sentence ϕ then EA $ ϕ. More formally, since we have (1), for each natural number p we have
Thus for each natural i we have
Therefore for each natural i we have
We fix i. Let us reason in EA: we assume ϕ i and want to show RFN Σ1 pEAφ i`1 q. We have some proof p of a false Σ 1 sentence ψ in IΣ 2 such that we have RFN Σ1 pR p´i Σ1 pEA`ϕ i`1 qq. We use (2) in the case of our i. This gives us that p ą i. Hence since p´i ą 0,
And since ψ is a false Σ 1 -sentence, we conclude
Therefore we have
pEA`ϕ i`1. 
Iterated reflection and conservativity
In this section we will prove a number of conservation theorems relating iterated reflection and transfinite induction. These results are inspired by the following theorem, which is often known as Schmerl's formula [15] . Theorem 4.1 (Schmerl) . Provably in EA`, for any α ă ε 0 ,
Note that here ε 0 is the standard Cantor notaion up to the ordinal ε 0 (below we give relativized version of this notation). For α ă ε 0 , the ordinal notaion ω n pαq ă ε 0 is given by the term α if n " 0 and the term ω ωn´1pαq , if n ą 0. Schmerl's formula is a useful tool for calculating the proof-theoretic ordinals of first-order theories. In this section we will develop tools in the mold of Schmerl's formula for calculating the proof-theoretic ordinals of second-order theories. Throughout this section we will rely on the following analogue of Theorem 4.1, though we defer a proof until §6.2.
Theorem 4.2. Provably in EA`, for any ordinal notation α,
In the statement of Theorem 4.2 we are relying on a general definition of ε α for any ordinal notation α. We understand the former in accord with the following definition.
Definition 4.3.
Given an ordinal notation α, let T be the set of terms defined as follows.
‚ 0 and ε x , for x ă α are in T (we call these the "constants.")
Some of these terms represent the same objects. We will simultaneously define both those terms that are in normal form and the ordering ď εα on the normal forms. A term t " t 0`. ..`t k is in normal form if either t " 0 (i.e., k " 0 and t 0 " 0), or the following holds: (a) t 0 ě εα t 1 ě εα ... ě εα t k ą 0 and (b) each t i is either a constant or is of the form ω si , where s i is in normal form and s i ‰ ε x for any x. Every t P T can be brought into normal form by applying the following rules.
‚ + is associative.
Given t " t 0`. ..`t k and s " s 0`. ..`s l in normal form, we let t ď εα s if one of the following conditions apply. ‚ t " 0. ‚ t " ε x and, for some y ě α x, ε y occurs in s.
Here is a roadmap for the rest of this section. In §4.1 we prove that
pEA`pXqq.
In §4.3 we use this result to prove Theorem 1.6, i.e., that
In §5 we will use combine Theorem 1.6 with the results from §3 (especially Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3) to establish connections between iterated reflection and ordinal analysis. In particular, we will use iterated reflection principles to calculate the proof-theoretic ordinals of a wide range of theories. pEA`pXqq. This result will be used in the next section to calculate proof-theoretic ordinals of subsystems of second-order arithmetic.
Before proving the theorem we prove a few lemmas. These lemmas concern proof-theoretic properties of theories that are closed under an inference rule that we call the ∆ We denote by ϕrθpxqs the result of substitution of the free set variable X with the formula θpxq, i.e. to obtain ϕrθpxqs we first rename all the bounded variables of ϕ in order to ensure that there are no clashes with free variables of θ and then replace each atomic subformula of ϕ of the form t P X with θptq. We reason as follows.
U $ "T is closed under the ∆ 0 1 substitution rule," by assumption.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. ❑
With these lemmas on board we are ready for the proof of the main theorem of this subsection.
Proof. We prove the claim by reflexive induction. We reason in EA`and assume the reflexive induction hypothesis: provably in EA`, for any β ă α,
We reason as follows.
pEA`pXby reflexive induction.
Note that in the second step we are not only changing the theory on the inside of the parentheses, but that we are also moving from Π By Lemma 4.6, we infer that
This concludes the proof of the theorem. pRCA 0 q. The proof of the main theorem of this subsection is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.9. For our first step towards this result, we establish a conservation theorem relating extensions of ACA 0 with extensions of PApXq.
There is a standard semantic argument that ACA 0 is conservative over PA (see, e.g., [11] ). We will present a version of this argument for extensions of ACA 0 by Π First let us show how we could finish the proof without ensuring that our argument could be formalized in ACA 0 and only then indicate how to make the formalization. Indeed, it is easy to see that the second-order structure pM, Sq satisfy ACA 0`@ XϕpXq: the presence of full induction schema in U guarantees that pM, Sq satisfy set induction, our definition of S guarantees that arithmetical comprehension holds in pM, Sq, and the fact that we had axioms tϕrθs : θ is Π 0 8 u in U guarantees that @XϕpXq holds in pM, Sq. And since ψpXq failed in M, the sentence @X ψpXq fails in pM, Sq. Therefore ACA 0`@ XϕpXq & @X ψpXq. Now let us show how to make the formalization of the latter argument in ACA 0 . We want to show that we could extend pM, Sq to a weak model of ACA 0`@ XϕpXq. We recall that a weak model of a theory T is a structure equipped with a partial truth definition that satisfies Tarski's clauses and covers all the substitutional variants of subformulas of axioms of T , see [17, Definition II.8.9] . From the truth definition from M we trivially construct the partial truth definition for pM, Sq that covers all Π 0 8 formulas with parameters from pM, Sq. And since we are working in ACA 0 , using arithmetical comprehension for every (externally) fixed n we could expand the latter partial truth definition to all the formulas constructed from Π Although we don't give proof here, we note that with some additional care it is possible to establish Lemma 4.10 in EA`using Π 2 -conservativity of WKL ‹ 0`" super-exponentiation is total" over EA`, see [16] for the Π 2 -conservativity of WKL ‹ 0 over EA. But it isn't possible to prove this result in EA since there is superexponential speed-up of ACA 0 over PA. Proof. We prove the claim by reflexive induction. We reason within EA`and assume the reflexive induction hypothesis: provably in EA`, for all β ă α, PApXqR
pPApXqq is closed under substitution. First we note that
To prove that the former is closed under substitution it suffices to prove that every finite sub theory of the latter is closed under substitution. Let us consider, for
ApXq˘S ince first-order logic is closed under substitutions, to prove that S is closed under substitution, it suffices to show that S proves every substitution-variant of its own axioms. Let us use the name U to denote the theory R β Π 0
8`P
ApXq˘. An axiom of the theory S is (either an axiom of PApXq or is) a sentence of the form @ y`P r U`ϕ pX, yq˘Ñ ϕpX, yq˘. By reflexive induction, U is provably closed under substitution. So S proves @ y`P r U`ϕ pX, yq˘Ñ ϕpθ, yq˘for any formula θ. This is to say that S proves every substitution instance of its axioms. ❑ Proof. We prove the claim by reflexive induction. We reason within ACA 0 and assume the reflexive induction hypothesis: provably in ACA 0 , for all β ă α, R
pPApXqq. We reason as follows.
ApXq˘¯by reflexive induction.
ApXq˘¯rθs by Lemma 4.10.
ApXq˘¯by Remark 4.14.
This concludes the proof. ❑
The proof of the the main theorem of this section is now straightforward, given Theorem 4.9 and Lemma 4.15. Proof. We reason as follows.
pPApXqq by Lemma 4.15.
pEA`pXqq by Theorem 4.2.
pRCA 0 q by Theorem 4.9.
Note for each Π This completes the proof of the theorem. ❑
Reflection ranks and proof-theoretic ordinals
In this section we introduce the notion of reflection rank. We then use the results from the previous section to establish connections between reflection ranks and proof-theoretic ordinals.
Reflection ranks.
Let us consider second-order theories T Ě ACA 0 and the reflection order ă Π 1 1 on them:
For a theory T Ě ACA 0 we define the reflection rank |T | ACA0 P On Y t8u as the rank of T in the order ă Π 1 1 .
Remark 5.1. We recall that as usual the rank function ρ : A Ñ On Y t8u for a binary relation pA, Ÿq is the only function such that ρpaq " suptρpbq`1 | b Ÿ au. Here the linear order on ordinals ď and the operation α Þ Ñ α`1 is extended to the class On Y t8u by puting α ă 8, for all α P On and puting 8`1 " 8; note that ρpaq P On iff the cone tb | b Ÿ au is well-founded with respect to Ÿ.
Theorem 3.2 states that |T |
We will also consider the more general notion of reflection rank with respect to some other base theory. For second-order theories U Ě RCA 0 we consider the reflection order ă Π 1
Let us consider some base theory T 0 Ě RCA 0 . The set E-T 0 consists of all the theories U such that EA proves that U Ě T 0 . For U P E-T 0 we denote by |U | T0 the rank of U in the order pE-T 0 , ă Π 1 1 pΠ 0 3. Π 
But by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem T 0` ConpT 0 q is consistent. This is to say that, though T 0` ConpT 0 q is not Π 1 1 sound, |T 0` ConpT 0 q| T0 P On. Note that later we will introduce a notion of robust reflection rank that enjoys much better behavior and, in particular, satisfies the converse of Corollary 5.4.
For an ordinal notation α we denote by |α| P On Y t8u the rank of the ordinal notation in the order ă. We now want to formalize the the latter fact by a single Σ It is easy to see that indeed we could form a Σ We will derive Lemma 5.10 from the more general Lemma 5.11. We will follow Simpson's formalization of countable coded models of the language of second-order arithmetic [17, Definition VII.2.1]. We note that the property "M is a countable coded ω-model" is arithmetical. The expression X P M denotes the natural Σ 0 2 formula that expresses the fact that the set X is coded in a model M . For each fixed second-order formula ϕpX 1 , . . . , X n , x 1 , . . . , x n q the expression  M |ù ϕpX 1 , . . . , X n , x 1 , . . . , x n q denotes the natural second-order formula that expresses that M is a countable coded ω-model, sets X 1 , . . . , X n are coded in M, and ϕpX 1 , . . . , X n , x 1 , . . . , x n q is true in M; note that this formalization is a Π 0 mformula, where m depends only on the depth of quantifier alternations in ϕ. For a fixed theory T given by finite list of axioms, we denote by M |ù T the formula M |ù ϕ, where ϕ is the conjunction of all the axioms of T .
Now assume for a contradiction that |R
For each theory T 0 Ě RCA 0 given by a finite list of axioms we denote by T0 the theory T 0`" every set is contained in an ω-model of T 0 ." We use this notation by analogy with ACA0 . Note that inside RCA 0 we could construct the Turing jump TJ pXq from any ω-model of RCA 0 containing X; thus, for any T 0 Ě RCA 0 , T0 extends ACA 0 . We note that for T 0 " ACA 0 the theory T0 is just ACA0 and for T 0 " RCA 0 the theory T0 is just ACA 0 . 
Lemma 5.11. For each T 0 given by finite list of axioms
We prove the lemma by reflexive induction over α. We reason in RCA 0 and assume the reflexive induction hypothesis
We need to show that RFN And Proposition 5.6 gives us
This completes the proof. ❑
Extensions of ACA0 .
It is usually attributed to Kreisel that for extensions T Ě ACA 0 the proof-theoretic ordinal |T | WO " |T`ϕ| WO , for any true Σ 1 1 -sentence ϕ (see [13, Theorem 6.7.4, 6.7.5] ). We note that our notion of reflection rank |T | ACA0 doesn't enjoy the same property.
Remark 5.13. Let us consider an ordinal notation system α for some large recursive ordinal, for example the Bachmann-Howard ordinal. Now we construct a pathological ordinal notation α 1 as follows:
We see externally that α 1 is isomorphic to α, since ACA 0 is consistent. Let us denote by Iso the formalization of the fact that α and α 1 are isomorphic. Clearly,
and of course depending on the choice of α, the value |ACA 0`W Opαq| ACA 0 could be an arbitrarily large recursive ordinal. At the same time, the theory ACA 0` ConpACA 0 q proves that α 1 is isomorphic to some finite order and hence
the latter equality follows from Remark 5.5. The upshot is that there are (Σ 1 1 unsound) theories whose proof-theoretic ordinals can be arbitrarily high but whose reflection rank is 0.
We address this problem with two different results. First in Theorem 5.14 we show that for any extension T Ě ACA0 , |T | ACA 0 " |T | WO . Second we propose notion of robust reflection rank |¨| ‹ ACA0 that enjoys a number of nice properties and at the same time coincides with reflection rank |¨| ACA 0 , for many natural theories T (in particular, for any any T such that T " Proof. First let us show that |T | WO ě ε α . Assume α " 8. Then by Proposition 5.16 there is false Π 1 1 sentence ϕ that is provable in T . Now we could construct an ordinal notation α such that WOpαq is ACA 0 -provably equivalent to ϕ: we put ϕ in the tree normal [17, Lemma V.1.4] form and put α to be the Kleene-Brouwer order on the tree. Clearly, T $ WOpαq and |α| " 8. Thus |T | WO " 8 " ε α .
Now assume that α P On. Let us consider some β ă ε α and show that |T | WO ą β. From the definition of robust reflection rank it is easy to see that we could find some true Σ 
contradiction. ❑
Ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles
In this section we turn to ordinal notation systems based on reflection principles. Beklemishev introduced such a notation system in [3] . We will formally describe such a notation system momentarily, but, roughly, the elements of such notation systems are theories axiomatized by reflection principles and the ordering on them is given by consistency strength. Beklemishev endorsed the use of such notation systems as an approach to the well-known canonicity problem of ordinal notation systems. Since then, such notation systems have been intensively studied [8] .
In §6.1 we present an application of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 to ordinal analysis. In particular, we present a straightforward well-foundedness proof for Beklemishev's RC 0 notation system for ε 0 .
In §6.2 we prove Theorem 4.2, a generalization of Schmerl's formula. Recall that we stated Theorem 4.2 in §4 but deferred the proof until §6.2. We have deferred the proof until this section because we believe that the use of ordinal notation systems based reflection principles clarifies the proof. 6.1. Well-foundedness of ordinal notation systems. Let us consider the calculus RC 0 due to Beklemishev [5] . The set of formulas of RC 0 is given by the following inductive definition: 
Let us describe the intended interpretation of
We denote by W the set of all RC 0 formulas. The binary relations ă n , and the natural equivalence relation " given by
The Beklemishev ordinal notation system for ε 0 is the structure pW {", ă 0 q.
The following result is due to Beklemishev:
Theorem 6.1. pW{", ă 0 q is a well-ordering with the order type ε 0 .
The fact that pW{", ă 0 q is a linear order is provable by a purely syntactical argument within the system RC 0 . But Beklemishev's proof of the well-foundedness of pW{", ă 0 q was based on the construction of an isomorphism with Cantor's ordinal notation system for ε 0 , i.e., Cantor normal forms.
Here we will give proofs of the well-foundedness part of Theorem 6.1 by providing an alternative interpretation of the ✸ n 's by reflection principles in second-order arithmetic and then applying the results of §3 to derive well-foundedness. Proof. We prove that the set W of RC 0 -formulas is well-founded with respect to ă 0 .
We give an alternative interpretation of RC 0 . We put the interpretation J ‹ of J to be ACA 0 . We put the interpretation pA^Bq Proof. Let us fix some A P W. We find k such that for all ✸ n in A we have n ă k. Now we reason in ACA 0 . We assume for a contradiction that there is an infinite descending chain A 0 ą 0 A 1 ą 0 . . . of RC 0 -formulas.
We construct a countably-coded ω-model M of RCA 0 that contains this chain. We construct the set that encodes partial truth definition for Π Note that our technique is very close to the ordinal analysis of PA and its fragments in terms of iterated reflection [2, 4] , although we use the more recently developed reflection calculus [7, 6] instead of polymodal logic. Let us fix for rest of the section some ordinal notation system α. We consider an expansion RC 0 rI ăα s of the calculus RC 0 . The language of the calculus RC 0 rI ăα s expands the language of RC 0 by constants I β , for β ă α. The new inference rules of RC 0 rI ăα s are (1) I β $ I γ , for all γ ă β; (2) I β $ ✸ n I γ , for all γ ă β and n; (3) I β $ ✸ n J, for all n. We consider the following evaluation A ‹ of RC 0 rI ăα s formulas by r.e. pseudo-Π
It is easy to see that this interpretation of RC 0 rI ăα s is sound.
Remark 6.4. We will be concerned with the formalization of results about RC 0 rI ăα s in EA`. Note that definitions above could be formalized in EA`and since EA`proves Π 2 -reflection for EA, we see that EA`could verify soundness of the described semantics of RC 0 rI ăα s.
Further in the section we will claim that certain combinatorial proofs are formalizable in EA`. Often the natural proofs that we give rely on Σ 1 -induction which is not present in EA`. But in all these cases it is easy to show that there are super-exponential bounds for the the sizes of witnesses and hence the arguments are formalizable in EA`.
The set S n rI ăα s consists of all the RC 0 rI ăα s formulas without ✸ 0 , . . . , ✸ n´1 . The order ă n on S n is given by A ă n B if A $ ✸ n B. or some I βi . If each C i is J then A is equivalent to J. Suppose some of the C i are conjuncts of the form I βi . Then we put A into the form 2 by choosing β to be ă-maximum of all β i .
Finally we consider the case when all C i are either J or some ✸ mi B i . In this case we put A into the form 3 by taking m to be the maximum of all m i 's and then applying axiom (6) of RC 0 to put the formula to the desired form. 
Theorem 6.8. pEA`q For any n ě 0 and formula A P S n rI ăα s, we have
BănA, BPSnrIăαs
Proof. Since the evaluation ‹ is sound, we have
Thus, it is left for us to show that
By Lemma 6.5 it is enough to consider the following cases for A:
✸ mi A i , where all m i ě n;
✸ m A i , where k ě 1 and m ą n`1.
The cases (1) and (3) are trivial. Let us consider the case (4). We apply Theorem 6.7 and get
Hence we only need to show for each i that the theory
BănA, BPSnrIăαs 
❑
Finally let us show that all the orders pS n rI ăα s{ ", ă n q are isomorphic to ε α . We will achieve this by introducing normal forms for RCrI ăα s formulas.
We define the set of all formulas in normal form N F rI ăα s and the order ă N F on them by a joint inductive definition:
(1) J P N F rI ăα s; (2) I β P N F rI ăα s; (3) J ă N F I β ; (4) I β ă I γ , for β ă γ; , for m ď n and k ě 1. Since the order on Cantor normal forms is essentially a lexicographical order, it is easy to see that the following lemma holds: Lemma 6.9. pEA`q The function o n is an order isomorphism between pN F rI ăα s X S n rI ăα s, ă N F q and pε α , ăq. Lemma 6.10. pEA`q If A P pN F rI ăα s X S n rI ăα sq, B P N F rI ăα s, and B ă N F A then B ă n A.
Proof. Let us fix any natural n 0 . It is easy to prove the lemma for all n ď n 0 by induction on |A|`|B|. ❑ Lemma 6.11. pEA`q The binary relations ă n on RCrI ăα s formulas are irreflexive.
Proof. Clearly, ă n Ďă 0 and hence it is enough to prove the lemma only for ă 0 . Assume for a contradiction A $ ✸ 0 A for some formula A. The derivation uses only finitely many distinct ✸ n 's and I β 's. We consider some m that is greater than any n such that ✸ n appears in the derivation. Assume that the only formulas of the form I β that are present in the derivation are I β1 , . . . , I β k , where β 1 ă . . . ă β k . We now consider a translation trp¨q that transforms a RCrI ăα s formula by replacing I βi with ✸ i m J. Now by a trivial induction on the derivation we show that RC proves the translations of all the formulas from the derivation that we considered. Hence trpAq $ RC trp✸ 0 Aq. But as Beklemishev showed by simple combinatorial methods this couldn't be the case [6, Theorem 12] . ❑ Combining Lemma 6.10 and Lemma 6.11 we get the following Lemma 6.12. pEA`q The orders ă n and ă N F coincide on N F rI ăα s X S n rI ăα s.
Now let us show that N F rI ăα s forms a set of normal forms for RC 0 rI ăα s formulas.
Lemma 6.13. pEA`q Each S n rI ăα s formula A is equivalent to a formula from N F rI ăα s X S n rI ăα s.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the amount of ✸-type connectives in |A|. To make our induction work, we simultaneously prove the additional claim that the normal form of A has exactly as many or fewer ✸-type connectives as A. Each formula A is of the form Ź
1ďiďk
A i , where each A i is either J, or some ✸ m B, or some I β . First let us consider the case when all A i are either J, or of the form I β . In this case we see that A is equivalent to either J or some I β . In any other case we could find the unique n such that A P S n rI ăα szS n`1 rI ăα s. It is easy to show by induction on the length of a formula C P S n rI ăα szS n`1 rI ăα s that there are s ě 1, formulas C 1 , . . . , C s P S n rI ăα s, and a formula C 1 P S n`1 such that C " C ✸ n B i , where A 1 P S n`1 rI ăα s and all B i P S n rI ăα s and the overall number of ✸-type connectives is the same. Since we could apply the inductive hypothesis to the B i 's, without loss of generality we may assume that all the B i 's are from N F rI ăα s X S n rI ăα s and A 1 P N F rI ăα s X S n rI ăα s. Since the normal forms are linearly ordered we can find a ă N F -greatest B l , where 1 ď l ď s. From Lemma 6.10 we see that ✸ n B l $ ✸ n B i , for all 1 ď i ď s. Thus, A is equivalent to A 1^✸ n B l . The latter formula is actually of the form (4) C 0^✸n pC 1^✸n pC 2 . . . ✸ n pC r´1^✸n C r qq, where all the C i P N F rI ăα s X S n`1 rI ăα s and C 1 ď N F C 2 ď N F . . . ď N F C r . We see that if C 0 ą N F C 1 then using Lemma 6.10 we could show that A is equivalent to C 0^✸n pC 2 . . . ✸ n pC r´1^✸n C r qq.
Now we could apply this transformation to A several times until we will ensure that it is equivalent to a formula of the form (4), where C 0 ď N F C 1 . Thus we found a formula in normal form that is equivalent to A. ❑ Lemma 6.14. pEA`q For any n ě 0, ordinal notation α, and formula A P S n rI ăα s we have
Proof. To prove the lemma we work inside EA`and show by reflexive induction on β that for all α and n if β ă ε α then
Note that here o´1 n is a function from ε α to S n rI ăα s. 
